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DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO. 
THE APPLICATION OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
AND MUTUAL TRUST
Marloes Spreeuw*
Summary: This paper focuses on the principles of mutual recognition 
and mutual trust in the area of justice and home affairs, with which 
the current Member States are supposed to comply and which are so 
vigorously applied in the Western Balkans. The growing importance of 
these principles both for the Member States and the candidate and po-
tential candidate countries will be discussed, since the pre-accession 
framework is a very powerful tool to export these values and principles 
to the Western Balkans. In addition, the paper will argue that on the 
one hand the EU is aware that the current Member States do not com-
ply with these values and principles and the tools available to force 
the Member States to comply are very weak. On the other hand, the 
Western Balkan countries are not allowed one step further towards 
membership if they do not comply with these values and principles. 
This illustrates that the EU has double standards in the application of 
its values and principles.
1. Introduction
Applying the principle of mutual recognition and mutual trust has 
been the driving force of European integration in the area of justice and 
home affairs. Strengthening judicial cooperation is and has been in the 
recent past one of the key priorities for the EU. Applying mutual recogni-
tion could lead to more rapid proceedings, would create more legal cer-
tainty in the EU, and in general would strengthen judicial cooperation.1 
The justiﬁ cation for compliance with these principles is based on the 
values upon which the EU is founded and which are spelled out in the 
opening parts of the TEU. All Member States are supposed to adhere to 
these principles and values. Moreover, the pre-accession policy is a very 
strong tool to export these values and principles to the candidate and 
potential candidate countries. Consequently, regional cooperation and 
minimisation and prevention of organised crime, corruption, irregular 
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1 See Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions 
in criminal matters, OJ C 12/10, 15 January 2001, 1.
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migration and trafﬁ cking in human beings, ie Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA), have become one of the main objectives for the EU in its pre-ac-
cession policy concerning the Western Balkans. 
With the growing importance of JHA issues in the relations between 
the EU and the Western Balkans, one would expect ﬁ rst of all compli-
ance with the key principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust of 
the current Member States. However, a judgment of December 2011 in 
the joined cases NS v SSHD and ME & Others v Refugee Applications Com-
missioner & MEJLR,2 the Assange saga and non-compliance with the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in criminal proceedings all 
demonstrate that the EU is fully aware that some of its current Member 
States do not comply with the values and standards which are so vigor-
ously insisted upon with regard to candidate and potential candidate 
countries. Additionally, the Cooperation and Veriﬁ cation Mechanism es-
tablished for Romania and Bulgaria in order to monitor the progress that 
the countries still had to make in the JHA area after joining the EU is 
not as effective as hoped. They still have to achieve convincing results in 
the ﬁ ght against corruption and crime and in reforming judicial practice. 
This illustrates, ﬁ rstly, how weak the pre-accession policy can be when 
candidate countries for membership do not really share the values of 
the EU but are let in against all the odds. Secondly, it demonstrates the 
ineffectiveness of post-accession conditionality, eg the Cooperation and 
Veriﬁ cation Mechanism. Moreover, the existing actions to force Member 
States to comply with these values and standards are not efﬁ cient. The 
infraction procedure cannot be used to force Member States to comply 
with the general principles and values of the EU. Therefore, the EU has 
no tools, apart from article 7 TEU, to force the current Member States 
to comply with these values and principles. However, article 7 has never 
been activated and it is unlikely that this will happen in the future. Nev-
ertheless, the prospects of candidate and potential candidate countries 
concerning future membership depend on compliance with these values 
and principles. This illustrates that the entire system is rather weak and 
lacks coherent enforcement machinery to guarantee that there are no 
double standards.
The objective of this paper is to analyse the difﬁ culties that the cur-
rent Member States encounter in the application of the principles of mu-
tual recognition and mutual trust, and the related issue of the Western 
Balkans depending on compliance with these principles for their future 
membership. To cover these issues, this paper is structured so that the 
second section discusses the growing importance of mutual recognition 
2  Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS and Others v SSHD and ME & Others v Refugee 
Applications Commissioner & MEJLR nyr.
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and mutual trust within the EU and the weakness of the existing tools 
to enforce Member States to comply with these principles and standards. 
The third section discusses recent examples showing that the current 
Member States still struggle in applying the principles of mutual recog-
nition and mutual trust in the area of JHA. The fourth part examines 
the post-conditionality used for Bulgaria and Romania and comments on 
its inefﬁ ciency. The ﬁ fth section focuses on the importance of the princi-
ples of mutual recognition and mutual trust in the pre-accession policy 
for the Western Balkans. Finally, in the last part, the EU’s conditionality 
approach in the pre-accession framework is discussed, illustrating the 
strength of the future membership incentive.
2. Judicial cooperation within the EU: substance and enforcement
The JHA area and more speciﬁ cally EU criminal law is a rapidly 
evolving ﬁ eld, where the developments have been remarkable and the 
growth of EU measures are striking. In order to strengthen judicial co-
operation between Member States and to enhance the protection of indi-
vidual rights, one of the main features of EU law in the ﬁ eld of criminal 
law at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century 
has been the application of measures related to mutual recognition and 
mutual trust.3 A prerequisite for the implementation of the principle of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters is that Member States have trust 
in each others’ criminal justice systems. The rationale of the presump-
tion that Member States could have mutual trust in their fellow Member 
States’ criminal justice systems is based on the values upon which the 
EU is founded and which are spelled out in the opening parts of the 
TEU. More speciﬁ cally, as mentioned in the programme of measures to 
implement the principle of mutual recognition in this ﬁ eld, ‘that trust 
is grounded, in particular, on their shared commitment to the princi-
ples of freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law’.4
Therefore, it can be argued that European integration concerning 
JHA matters and in particular criminal law is based on the principles of 
mutual recognition and mutual trust. However, the actions available to 
force Member States to comply with these highly important principles in 
this area are rather weak. First of all, though, since the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court has had full jurisdiction to rule on infrac-
tion procedures in JHA matters, although with a ﬁ ve-year transnational 
period for measures adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon 
3  Programme of measures (n 1).
4  Programme of measures (n 1) 1.
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Treaty. It is extremely difﬁ cult to use this action with regard to Member 
States that do not comply with the common values and principles of the 
EU, ie the principle of mutual recognition and mutual trust. Secondly, 
the only serious action available against Member States who do not com-
ply is article 7 TEU. However, article 7 has never been activated and it 
seems very unlikely that this will happen in the future. 
2.1. The growing importance of mutual recognition and mutual 
trust within the EU.
The ﬁ rst developments concerning judicial cooperation within the 
European Union began with the Council of Europe Conventions in the 
late 1950s,5 followed by several other Conventions.6 The approach to ju-
dicial cooperation changed with the entry into force of the Treaty of Am-
sterdam on 1 May 1999. The Treaty introduced a new objective in article 
29, the development of the Union as an ‘area of freedom, security and 
justice’. Associated with the incorporation of the Schengen acquis into 
Union law, free movement in an area without internal frontiers was the 
objective for an area of freedom, security and justice and this became 
the framework within which EU action on JHA matters would be in-
terpreted.7 In order to achieve an area of freedom, security and justice, 
mutual recognition evolved as the main principle. 
In 1998, the UK government, during its EU presidency, proposed to 
apply the mutual recognition principle in order to enhance judicial co-
operation. This led to the recognition at the Cardiff European Council of 
‘the need to enhance the ability of national legal systems to work closely 
together … [and the Council was asked] to identify the scope for greater 
mutual recognition of decisions of each others’ courts’.8 This approach 
for improving judicial cooperation in the EU via mutual recognition was 
upheld in the following years.9 In 1999, the European Council in its 
Tampere Conclusions, setting up a ﬁ ve-year agenda for EU Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA), focused on the importance of mutual recognition 
of judicial decisions. The European Council’s view of mutual recogni-
5  See for the Convention on extradition 1957, European Treaty Series 24, 86 and 98, and 
for the Convention on mutual assistance 1959, the European Treaty Series 30 and 99.
6  Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons 1983, European Treaty Series 70 and 
112; Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Conﬁ scation of the Proceeds from 
Crime 1990, European Treaty Series 141. See, for more detail, Steve Peers, EU Justice and 
Home Affairs Law (3rd edn, OUP 2011) ch 9.
7  Valsamis Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (1st edn, Hart Publishing 2009) 13.
8  Cardiff European Council, Presidency Conclusions of 15 and 16 June 1998, doc SN 
150/11/98 Rev 1, para 39.
9  Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘The Constitutional Implication of Mutual Recognition in Criminal 
Matters’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 1277, 1279.
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tion is that it ‘should become the cornerstone of judicial co-operation in 
both civil and criminal matters within the Union. The principle should 
apply both to judgments and to other decisions of judicial authorities’.10 
The use of mutual recognition with regards to judicial cooperation would 
improve the traditional system which is slow, cumbersome and uncer-
tain.11 According to the Council it could lead to more rapid proceed-
ings, it would create more legal certainty in the EU and in general would 
strengthen cooperation.12 As requested in the Tampere conclusions, the 
Council adopted a programme of measures to implement the principle of 
mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters.13 In the following 
years, this programme was implemented and the ﬁ rst, and most ana-
lysed, example of mutual recognition is the Framework Decision on a 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW),14 which replaced the system of extradi-
tion between Member States.15 Moreover, the Hague Programme of 2004 
10  Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions of 15 and 16 October 1999, para 
33.
11  Commission, Mutual Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters (Communica-
tion) COM (2000) 495 ﬁ nal, 2.
12  Programme of measures (n 1).
13  The programme consisted of 24 very detailed measures which were divided into several 
chapters. See Programme of measures (n 1); for a discussion of the development of the 
principle, see Steve Peers, ‘Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the European Union: 
Has the Council Got it Wrong?’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 5; and Sandra Lavenex, ‘Mutual Recog-
nition and the Monopoly of Force: Limits of the Single Market Analogy’ (2007) 14 Journal of 
European Public Policy 762.
14  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest 
Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L190.
15  Further mutual recognition measures were adopted with the Framework Decisions on: 
the execution of orders freezing property and evidence; ﬁ nancial penalties; execution of con-
ﬁ scation orders; a European Evidence Warrant; the transfer of sentenced persons; proba-
tion and parole orders; pre-trial supervision orders; recognition of convictions; the exchange 
of criminal records and in absentia trials. See Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA 
of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the EU of orders freezing property or evidence [2003] 
OJ L196; Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the applica-
tion of the principle of mutual recognition to ﬁ nancial penalties [2005] OJ L76/16; Council 
Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions in 
the Member States of the European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings [2008] 
OJ L220/32; Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the 
European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for 
use in proceedings in criminal matters [2008] OJ L350/72; Council Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recogni-
tion to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving 
deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union [2008] 
OJ L327/27; Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions 
with a view to the supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions [2008] OJ 
L337/102; Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the applica-
tion, between Member States of the European Union, of the principle of mutual recognition 
to decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention [2009] OJ 
L294/20; Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the or-
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and its related Action Plan also encouraged the development of mutual 
recognition measures.16 
The development of the Union as an area of freedom, security and 
justice gained an even more prominent position in the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which entered into force on December 2009. It now appears in the open-
ing parts of the TEU, where the most important of the Union’s objectives 
are stated.17 Moreover, the heading of Title V TFEU, where the provisions 
on JHA can be found, is also called the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’. Additionally, mutual recognition also obtained an important 
place in the Lisbon Treaty. The ﬁ rst provision of the Title on the ‘Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice’ states that ‘the Union shall endeavour to 
ensure a high level of security through mutual recognition in criminal 
matters and, if necessary through the approximation of criminal law’.18 
The provisions on judicial cooperation in criminal matters also dem-
onstrate the dominant position of mutual recognition in JHA matters. 
According to article 82(1) TFEU: ‘Judicial cooperation in criminal mat-
ters in the Union shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition 
of judgments and judicial decisions’. Furthermore, a legal basis to adopt 
minimum rules on speciﬁ c areas regarding criminal matters only exists 
‘to the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments 
and judicial decisions’.19 Mitsilegas argues that this indicates that: 
[T]he conferral to the Union of competence to adopt measures in the 
ﬁ eld of criminal procedure is subordinated to mutual recognition. 
The adoption of every measure on criminal procedure under this 
provision must be justiﬁ ed as facilitating mutual recognition.20 
The above demonstrates that the Treaty of Lisbon provides a proper 
legal basis for the principle of mutual recognition.21 In approximately 
ganisation and content of the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record 
between Member States [2009] OJ L93/23.
16  Peers (n 6) 660.
17  See art 3(2) TEU. 
18  Art 67(3) TFEU. 
19  Art 82(2) TFEU.
20  Mitsilegas (n 7) 157.
21  Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, several measures in the ﬁ eld of criminal 
law have been proposed and ﬁ ve Directives have been adopted. See Parliament and Council 
Directive 2010/65/EU of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in 
criminal proceedings [2010] OJ L280/1; Parliament and Council Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 
April 2011 on preventing and combating trafﬁ cking in human beings and protecting victims 
[2011] OJ L101/1; Parliament and Council Directive 2011/92/EU of 13 December 2011 on 
combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography [2011] 
OJ L335/1; Parliament and Council Directive 2011/99/EU of 13 December 2011 on the Eu-
ropean protection order [2011] OJ L338/2; Parliament and Council Directive 2012/13/EU of 
22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L142/1.
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one and a half decades, mutual recognition and, in parallel with that, 
mutual trust, have become key principles in the JHA ﬁ eld and have cap-
tured a place among the common values and principles upon which the 
Union is founded.
2.2. The enforcement of mutual recognition and mutual trust
With the development of the Union as an area of freedom, security 
and justice, the principle of mutual recognition that relies on the notion 
that there is mutual trust between Member States’ justice systems based 
on common standards of respect for the rule of law, democracy and hu-
man rights has been at the heart of JHA policy.22 Nevertheless, the en-
forcement machinery available to force Member States to comply with the 
common values and principles of the EU is not very strong. The Com-
mission, as guardian of the Treaties, can initiate infringement proceed-
ings against Member States that fail to implement Union law and can 
bring the matter before the Court of Justice.23 However, the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice is limited with regards to third pillar measures 
adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, due to a ﬁ ve-year 
transnational period.24 Even though the Court of Justice has jurisdic-
tion regarding measures adopted after the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, the infringement procedure cannot be used to force Member 
States to comply with the common values and principles of the EU, such 
as the rule of law. It can only be activated when a Member State does 
not comply with or does not implement a speciﬁ c EU law, and cannot be 
activated in areas of pure national jurisdiction. The common values and 
principles upon which mutual trust is based cover extremely broad top-
ics and issues, do not have clear legal deﬁ nitions, and are inseparable 
principles.25
Therefore, the only serious action that can be activated when Mem-
ber States do not comply with the common values and principles of the 
EU is article 7 TEU. The Amsterdam Treaty established the possibility 
of remedial action by the Union in the event of a serious and persistent 
breach of common values by a Member State. According to article 7, in a 
situation where this occurs, the Council ‘may decide to suspend certain 
of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member 
State in question, including the voting rights of the representative of the 
22  Susie Alegre, Ivanka Ivanova and Dana Denis-Smith, ‘Safeguarding the Rule of Law in 
an Enlarged EU. The Cases of Bulgaria and Romania’ CEPS Special Report April 2009, 1 
<http://www.ceps.eu> accessed 16 May 2012.
23  Art 258-260 TFEU.
24  Lisbon Treaty Protocol 36 on transnational provisions.
25  Alegre, Ivanova and Denis-Smith (n 22).
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government of that Member State in the Council’. Apart from the event 
of an actual breach, article 7 also provides for a prevention mechanism 
in the event of a clear risk of a serious breach, which was added by the 
Nice Treaty. Therefore, article 7 TEU provides the Union institutions with 
the means of ensuring that all Member States respect the common val-
ues and principles listed in article 2 TEU and of which respect for these 
values and the concern to work together to promote them is a condition 
for any State which seeks to accede to the Union.26 As mentioned by the 
Commission: 
[T]he scope of Article 7 is not conﬁ ned to areas covered by Union 
law. This means that the Union could act not only in the event of a 
breach of common values in this limited ﬁ eld but also in the event of 
a breach in an area where the Member States act autonomously.27
However, article 7 has never been activated and it is not very likely 
that this will happen in the future.28 According to article 2 TEU, the EU 
is founded upon common standards, such as the rule of law. Neverthe-
less, the Union has not identiﬁ ed what these standards speciﬁ cally are, 
such as a deﬁ nition of the rule of law in the EU, which is a complex and 
vague concept surrounded by academic debate. In different legal systems 
and scholarly literature, there are many diverse views on the substance 
of the rule of law; it can mean many things and it can mean nothing.29 At 
the same time, there has been very little discussion regarding the proper 
conditions in which the action of article 7 can be activated. The reluc-
tance to discuss the possibility of using article 7 at a serious level gives 
the impression that it is a dead letter in the EU legislative framework.30 
This demonstrates that the EU does not have very powerful tools to force 
the Member States to comply with the EU values and principles upon 
which the Union is based.
26  Article 49 TEU. See Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Par-
liament of 15 October 2003 on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. Respect for and 
promotion of the values on which the Union is based COM (2003) 606 ﬁ nal, 5.
27  Commission (n 26) 5.
28  See for more detail Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Adding a Bite to a Bark? A Story of Article 7, the 
EU Enlargement, and Jörg Haider’ Legal Studies Research Paper No 10/01, January 2010, 
University of Sydney <http://ssrn.com/abstarct=1531393> accessed 4 April 2012.
29  See for more detail, Dimitry Kochenov, ‘EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality. 
Pre-Accession Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law’ (Kluwer Law 
International 2008).
30  Alegre, Ivanova and Denis-Smith (n 22) 18.
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3. Difﬁ culties in the application of mutual recognition and mutual 
trust
As a result of the EU objective to become an area of freedom, se-
curity and justice, cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs 
and the implementation of mutual recognition and mutual trust became 
key priorities for the EU. Consequently, the focus of the EU in pre-ac-
cession policy was also in the ﬁ eld of JHA, and cooperation in this area 
constituted a main concern. With the EU’s focus on the strict fulﬁ lment 
of the requirements in this area for the candidate and potential candi-
date countries of the Western Balkans, one would certainly expect the 
current Member States to comply with the standards and values of the 
EU in this ﬁ eld. However, as discussed above, enforcement of the com-
mon principles and standards of the EU is rather complicated. A recent 
judgment of the European Court of Justice demonstrates that the EU is 
acquainted with the fact that some Member States do not comply with 
standards and values which are so forcefully applied in the Western Bal-
kans. Moreover, the Assange saga, a highly debated case, and the non-
compliance of Member States with the ECHR in criminal proceedings, 
illustrate the difﬁ culties that Member States still encounter with the 
principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust. 
The joined cases NS v SSHD and ME & Others v Refugee Applica-
tions Commissioner & MEJLR31 demonstrate that Greece does not comply 
with the EU’s policy on asylum, which is ‘a constituent part of the EU’s 
objective of progressively establishing an area of freedom, security and 
justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek 
protection in the European Union’.32 In the course of these proceedings, 
thirteen Member States, the Swiss Confederation, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, Amnesty International and the AIRE 
Centre pointed out in their observations that in 2010 Greek external EU 
land and sea borders accounted for 90% of all detections of irregular bor-
der crossing along all EU external land and sea borders,33 ‘resulting in 
a disproportionate burden being borne by that State compared to other 
Member States and the inability of the Greek authorities to cope with the 
situation in practice’.34 
31  NS (n 2).
32  Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No 140/11, ‘An asylum seeker 
may not be transferred to a Member State where he risks being subjected to inhuman treat-
ment’ (Luxembourg, 21 December 2011).
33  See for more detail, Thematic Situation Report, ‘Coping with a Fundamental Rights 
Emergency: The Situation of Persons Crossing the Greek Land Border in an Irregular Man-
ner’ (2011) European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).
34  Thematic Situation Report (n 33) 2.
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In the ﬁ rst case, NS v SSHD, an Afghan national came to the United 
Kingdom after travelling through, among other countries, Greece, where 
he was arrested in 2008 and did not make an asylum application. Four 
days later he was released and ordered to leave Greece within 30 days. 
When he arrived in the United Kingdom, he immediately lodged an asy-
lum application, but he was later informed that he would be transferred 
to Greece, under the Dublin II Regulation, which serves to determine 
which EU Member State is responsible for examining an asylum applica-
tion lodged by a third country national on the territory of one of the EU 
Member States.35 Mr N S challenged this decision via legal proceedings 
where he alleged that there was a risk that his fundamental rights would 
be infringed were he to be sent back to Greece. In the related case ME & 
Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner & MEJLR, ﬁ ve persons, all 
unconnected with each other, originating from Afghanistan, Iran and 
Algeria, travelled via Greece where they were arrested for illegal entry. 
They then travelled to Ireland, where they claimed asylum. They resisted 
their return to Greece and claimed that the procedures and conditions 
for asylum seekers were inadequate in Greece. Under these circumstanc-
es, both the Court of Appeal of England and Wales (United Kingdom) and 
the High Court (Ireland) asked the European Court of Justice whether 
in the light of the overloading of the Greek asylum system and its 
effects on the treatment of asylum seekers and on the examination 
of their claims - the authorities of a Member State which should 
transfer the applicants to Greece (the Member State responsible for 
the examination of the asylum application under the Regulation) 
must ﬁ rst check whether that State actually observes fundamental 
rights.36
In the judgment of the joined cases, the European Court of Justice 
upheld the integrity of the common asylum policy but also ensured that 
asylum seekers’ rights are protected. In the judgment, the Court of Jus-
tice emphasised the importance of mutual trust for the effective opera-
tion of EU asylum law. A key paragraph of the judgment mentions the 
signiﬁ cance of mutual trust regarding EU cooperation in asylum and in 
justice and home affairs:
At issue here is the raison d’être of the European Union and the cre-
ation of an area of freedom, security and justice and, in particular, 
the Common European Asylum System, based on mutual conﬁ dence 
35  Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum appli-
cation lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national [2003] OJ L50. 
36  Press Release (n 32) 1.
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and a presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with Eu-
ropean Union law and, in particular, fundamental rights.37
This paragraph places mutual trust at the heart of the area of free-
dom, security and justice and therefore the Court of Justice held that the 
slightest infringement of the norm governing the right to asylum cannot 
be sufﬁ cient to prevent the transfer of an asylum seeker to the Member 
State primarily responsible, since that would deprive the States’ obliga-
tions in the Common European Asylum System of their substance, and 
endanger the objective of quickly designating the Member State respon-
sible for examining an asylum claim lodged in the European Union.38 
The judgment clearly demonstrates that apart from the fact that Greece 
does not comply with EU asylum law, Member States struggle with the 
principle of mutual trust. Equally, it is evident from the judgment that 
compliance with the common principles and standards is very impor-
tant. Noncompliance weakens the whole system based on mutual trust. 
In addition, the Assange saga demonstrates that Member States still 
encounter difﬁ culties when it comes to the application of mutual recog-
nition and mutual trust, the cornerstones of the objective to develop an 
area of freedom, security and justice within the EU. Julian Assange, a 
well-known Austrian national, through his operation in Wikileaks (an 
international, online, non-proﬁ t organisation that publishes submis-
sions of private and classiﬁ ed media from anonymous news sources and 
news leaks), visited Sweden to give a lecture in 2010. During his time 
in Sweden he had sexual relations with two women and was later ac-
cused of sexual offences. An arrest warrant was issued in November 
2010 because Assange was at that time living in England. An extradi-
tion hearing took place in an English court in February 2011 to consider 
the application by the Swedish authority to extradite Julian Assange. At 
the Belmarsh Magistrates Court, the decision to extradite Assange was 
upheld, despite the argument that was presented by Assange’s lawyers 
about whether the Swedish prosecutor had the authority to issue a Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant (EAW). On 2 March 2011, Julian Assange appealed 
to the High Court challenging the decision to extradite him to Sweden. 
Following the appeal hearing in July 2011 at the High Court in London, 
the judges dismissed the appeal on 2 November 2011. According to the 
English High Court:
[I]t cannot be said that the term judicial applies only to a judge who 
adjudicates. The differing European traditions recognise that others, 
including prosecutors, can be included within that term for various 
37  NS (n 2) para 83 (emphasis added).
38  NS (n 2) para 85.
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purposes. It is therefore entirely consistent with the principles of mu-
tual recognition and mutual conﬁ dence to recognise as valid an EAW 
issued by a prosecuting authority designated under Article 6. To do 
otherwise would be to construe the word ‘judicial’ out of context and 
look at it simply through the eyes of a common law judge, who would 
not consider a prosecutor as having a judicial position or acting as 
a judicial authority.39
After the dismissal of the High Court, an appeal was lodged at the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Initially, the High Court refused 
permission for an appeal to the Supreme Court; however, the Supreme 
Court granted permission because a point of law of general public im-
portance was involved. The point of law was whether a prosecutor is a 
judicial authority that can issue an EAW. On 30 May 2012, the Supreme 
Court decided by a majority of ﬁ ve to two to dismiss Assange s´ appeal 
against extradition. It held that a public prosecutor does fall under the 
term ‘judicial authority’ of the Extradition Act 2003. However, since the 
majority of the Court had based their decision on the interpretation of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, on which Assange s´ legal 
team was not given the opportunity to be heard, they submitted an ap-
plication to re-open the case on 12 June 2012. Submitting an application 
to the Supreme Court to re-open a case is extremely rare and there is no 
precedence that determines the timescale for the Court s´ decision on the 
request. Although it is difﬁ cult to say to what extent this puts Assange s´ 
extradition at risk, the fact that the case has dragged on for over two 
years demonstrates the problems that Member States still encounter 
with the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust. 
Moreover, respect for human rights is a requirement for the principle 
of mutual trust in other Member States’ criminal justice systems. One 
of the most important rights in criminal procedures is the right to a fair 
trial, which is set out in article 6 ECHR and which is recognised by the 
Court of Justice as part of the general EU principles.40 However, ECHR 
judgments indicate that some Member States fail to comply with the right 
to a fair trial. In several judgments, there have been difﬁ culties with the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to in absentia trials, 
where a person moved from one EU Member State to another Member 
State or who had already resided there before the conviction. The Stras-
bourg court held that this did not alter the ﬁ nding that when a defendant 
is informed of the proceedings and chooses not to attend, but would like 
to send a legal representative in their place, and the representative is not 
39  Case CO/1925/2011 Julian Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWCH 
2849 (Admin), para 41 (emphasis added).
40  See Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285.
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allowed to appear, then this is a breach of article 6 ECHR.41 As regards 
freezing orders (provisional measures pending a trial), the court ruled 
that Bulgaria breached article 6 ECHR which guarantees a trial within 
a reasonable time, due to the unreasonable time it took to decide on a 
damages action following an unlawful seizure of goods.42 The case law 
on the right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings is voluminous and this 
includes breaches by Member States,43 such as not informing the defend-
ant of the proceedings,44 by using evidence upon which the conviction 
is based and which is obtained in breach of article 3 of the Convention 
which entails a breach of article 6,45 and by conﬁ scating assets on the 
presumption that the person has committed a crime, while the person 
has been acquitted of the crime.46 The non-compliance of some Member 
States with the Convention and in particular of article 6 ECHR has ad-
verse effects on the principle of mutual trust in other Member States’ 
criminal justice systems, which forms a key part of the EU s´ mutual 
recognition principle.
4. Post accession conditionality: Romania and Bulgaria
When Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU on 1 January 2007, 
they still had progress to make in the ﬁ elds of judicial reform, corrup-
tion and organised crime in order to ensure their capacity to implement 
and apply measures adopted to establish an area of freedom, security 
and justice.47 For this reason, the Commission decided to establish the 
Cooperation and Veriﬁ cation Mechanism to monitor progress in these 
areas after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria. In December 2006, 
the Commission set speciﬁ c benchmarks for Bulgaria and Romania in 
two decisions, one addressed to Bulgaria48 and the other addressed to 
41  See Cases: Poitrimol v France (1993) Series A no 277-A; Pelladoah v Netherlands (1994) 
Series A 297-B; Krombach v France App no 29731/96 (ECHR, 13 February 2001).
42  See Patrikova v Bulgaria App no 71835/01 (ECHR, 4 March 2010).
43  See for more detail Peers (n 6) ch 9.3; and Stefan Trechsel and Sarah Summers, Human 
Rights in Criminal Proceedings (OUP 2005).
44  See Colozza v Italy (1985) Series A no 89; and Sedjovic v Italy App no 56581/00 (ECHR, 
1 March 2006).
45  See Jalloh v Germany App no 54810/00 (ECHR, 11 July 2006).
46  See Geerings v Netherlands App no 30810/03 (ECHR 1 March 2007).
47  Commission Decision 2006/929/EC of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism 
for cooperation and veriﬁ cation of progress in Bulgaria to address speciﬁ c benchmarks in 
the areas of judicial reform and the ﬁ ght against corruption and organised crime [2006] OJ 
L354, 56. 
48  Commission Decision 2006/929/EC (n 47). The Commission established six bench-
marks that needed to be addressed by Bulgaria: adopt constitutional amendments remov-
ing any ambiguity regarding the independence and accountability of the judicial system; 
ensure a more transparent and efﬁ cient judicial process by adopting and implementing a 
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Romania.49 The creation of the Cooperation and Veriﬁ cation Mechanism 
has categorised Bulgaria and Romania as the only two countries subject 
to enduring scrutiny by the Commission after their accession to the Eu-
ropean Union.50 
The Commission reports under the Cooperation and Veriﬁ cation 
Mechanism every six months on progress in judicial reform, the ﬁ ght 
against corruption and, concerning Bulgaria, the ﬁ ght against organised 
crime. The ﬁ rst progress reports of June 2007 conﬁ rmed that ‘progress 
achieved in the judicial treatment of high-level corruption cases is still 
insufﬁ cient’ in Bulgaria and Romania.51 The latest progress report of 
February 2012, more than 5 years after the accession of both countries, 
highlighted that further achievement is necessary from Bulgaria in: 
adopting the asset forfeiture legislation, taking a more comprehen-
sive approach in reforming judicial and investigative practice, en-
hancing the role of the Supreme Judicial Council in the reform of 
the judiciary and achieving convincing results in the ﬁ ght against 
corruption and organised crime.52 
new judicial system act and a new civil procedure code; report on the impact of these new 
laws and of the penal and administrative procedure codes, notably on the pre-trial phase; 
continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance professionalism, accountability and 
efﬁ ciency; evaluate the impact of this reform and publish the results annually; conduct and 
report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of high-level corruption; 
report on internal inspections of public institutions and on the publication of assets of high-
level ofﬁ cials; take further measures to prevent and ﬁ ght corruption, in particular at the bor-
ders and within local government; implement a strategy to ﬁ ght organised crime, focusing on 
serious crime, money laundering as well as on the systematic conﬁ scation of assets of crimi-
nals; report on new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas.
49  Commission Decision2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism 
for cooperation and veriﬁ cation of progress in Romania to address speciﬁ c benchmarks in 
the areas of judicial reform and the ﬁ ght against corruption [2006] OJ L354, 56. The Com-
mission created four benchmarks that needed to be addressed by Romania: ensure a more 
transparent and efﬁ cient judicial process notably by enhancing the capacity and account-
ability of the Superior Council of Magistracy; report and monitor the impact of the new civil 
and penal procedures codes; establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibili-
ties for verifying assets, incompatibilities and potential conﬂ icts of interest, and for issuing 
mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken; building on 
progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non-partisan investigations into 
allegations of high-level corruption; take further measures to prevent and ﬁ ght against cor-
ruption, in particular within the local government.
50  Eli Gateva, ‘Post-Accession Conditionality. Support Instrument for Continuous Pres-
sure?’ (2010) KFG Working Paper, Freie Universität <http://www.transformeurope.eu> ac-
cessed 16 April 2012. 
51  Commission, Report to the European Parliament and the Council of 27 June 2007 on 
Bulgaria’s progress on accompanying measures following accession COM (2007) 377 ﬁ nal; 
and Commission, Report to the European Parliament and the Council of 27 June 2007 on 
Romania’s progress on accompanying measures following accession, COM (2007) 378 ﬁ nal.
52  See Commission, Interim Report of 8 February 2012 on Progress under the Cooperation 
and Veriﬁ cation Mechanism in Bulgaria, Memo/12/72.
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For Romania, more progress was expected in: 
implementing the new codes, strengthening integrity and accounta-
bility within the judiciary, enhancing the dissuasive effect of judicial 
follow-up to high level corruption cases and ensuring a broad politi-
cal endorsement of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy.53 
The ongoing need for the post-accession conditionality, ie the Co-
operation and Veriﬁ cation Mechanism, demonstrates that Romania and 
Bulgaria still do not comply with the standards and values of the EU, 
which is a condition for the successful development of the Union as an 
area of freedom, security and justice. Although the Cooperation and 
Veriﬁ cation Mechanism initially seemed a useful tool for putting politi-
cal pressure on Romania and Bulgaria to maintain the momentum of 
improvements that they had demonstrated prior to their EU accession, 
in practice it is a relatively weak instrument with limited powers to press 
both Member States into reform.54
The slow progress of Romania and Bulgaria in the area of judicial 
reform and the ﬁ ght against corruption illustrates that the post-acces-
sion incentive is not as effective as the pre-accession ones. After acces-
sion, the EU loses its most powerful incentive, which is the prospect of 
membership, and the rewards concerning accession advancement are no 
longer available. However, the Treaty of Accession provided for three safe-
guard clauses,55 including a justice and home affairs safeguard clause, 
which permitted the Commission to establish appropriate measures if 
there were serious shortcomings or any imminent risk of such shortcom-
ings in the implementation of the acquis in the area of justice and home 
affairs. The Commission has never invoked the sanctions included in 
the safeguard provisions. As described by Gateva, there are arguments 
against the activation of the safeguard clause. Firstly, it would have sus-
pended cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs and in par-
ticular the application of the European Arrest Warrant.56 Secondly, as 
argued by Gateva:
The imposition of any of the safeguard provisions would have dam-
aged severely not only the reputation of Bulgaria and/or Romania 
but also the reputation of the Commission. Furthermore, it would 
53  See Commission, Interim Report of 8 February 2012 on Progress under the Cooperation 
and Veriﬁ cation Mechanism in Romania, Memo/12/71.
54  Alegre, Ivanova and Denis-Smith (n 22) 5.
55  The safeguard clauses could be activated until the end of a period of up to three years 
after accession. See the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Bul-
garia and Romania and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is 
founded [2005] OJ L157.
56  Gateva (n 50) 18.
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have discredited the EU’s decision to let Bulgaria and Romania be-
come members in 2007 and would have weakened the otherwise 
declining support for the ongoing enlargement with Turkey and the 
Western Balkans.57 
However, despite the arguments against the activation of the safe-
guard clause, new Member States, including Croatia, will be covered by 
the safeguard mechanism for three years upon accession, while, for the 
current Member States, the infraction procedure for pre-Lisbon mutual 
recognition measures does not apply. 
5. The Westerns Balkans and the principles of mutual recognition 
and mutual trust 
Although, the current Member States still encounter difﬁ culties in 
complying with the common principles and values of the EU, these val-
ues are vigorously imposed on the Western Balkans. Compliance with 
the common values and principles of the EU has become one of the cor-
nerstones in the pre-accession policy. Therefore, along with the growing 
importance of the development of the Union as an Area of Freedom, Se-
curity and Justice, regional cooperation in the Western Balkans in the 
JHA ﬁ eld has become a key priority in the pre-accession policy. The mo-
tive for the focus of EU external action in the area of JHA in the Western 
Balkan countries is based on the view that the internal security of the 
EU can be improved if EU internal security problems are tackled at their 
external origin.58 Since Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on 1 Janu-
ary 2007, the Western Balkans, a term used to designate the South-
eastern European countries of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Kosovo, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and 
Albania, are completely surrounded by EU Member States. Due to war 
legacies, political instability and a political climate in which organised 
crime, corruption, irregular migration and trafﬁ cking in human beings 
are common, the Western Balkans developed into an area of concern for 
the EU.59 Minimisation and prevention of these security threats has be-
come a priority for the EU in order to secure an area of freedom, security 
and justice within the EU.
57  Gateva (n 50) 19.
58  Florian Trauner, ‘EU Internal Security Policies in the Western Balkans: Analysing the 
Intersection between Enlargement and Civilian Crisis Management’ (2009) paper presented 
to the 11th Biennial International Conference of the European Union Studies Association 
<http://www.euce.org> accessed 19 April 2012. 
59  Commission, Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, a policy priority for the Eu-
ropean Union (2005) <http://ec.europe.eu> accessed 12 May 2012. 
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Due to the instability of the region, and uncertain transitions to 
democracy, the EU has developed a new and more ambitious strategy for 
the Western Balkans. The countries should be guided in their transfor-
mation ‘into stable, self-sufﬁ cient democracies, at peace with themselves 
and each other, with market economies and the rule of law, and which 
will be either members of the EU or in the road to membership’.60 To 
achieve this objective, as mentioned by Trauner, ‘the EU decided to apply 
its most successful foreign policy instrument, ie the incentive of mem-
bership’.61 In May 1999, after a proposal by the Commission, the Stabili-
sation and Association Process (SAP) was adopted,62 which constituted a 
new framework for EU negotiations with the Western Balkan countries. 
The SAP aims particularly to support the countries of the Western Bal-
kans to adopt and implement EU law by stabilising the countries and 
encouraging their swift transition to a market economy, by promoting 
regional cooperation, all with the prospect of eventual membership of 
the EU. The SAP is a transformation of the Union’s Regional Approach 
into a more sophisticated policy framework and provides modiﬁ ed and 
new offers to the Western Balkan countries.63 It is based on an ever-
closer partnership with the EU and offers improved trade concessions, 
economic and ﬁ nancial assistance, assistance for reconstruction, devel-
opment and stabilisation, cooperation in justice and home affairs and, 
most importantly, Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), a 
tailor-made category of legally binding agreements between the EU and 
each country of the Western Balkans.64 At the Santa Maria da Feira 
Council in 2000, the European Council in its Conclusions expressed the 
possibility of the Western Balkans countries joining the EU:
The European Council conﬁ rms that its objective remains the fullest 
possible integration of the countries of the region into the political 
and economic mainstream of Europe through the Stabilisation and 
Association process, political dialogue, liberalisation of trade and co-
operation in Justice and Home Affairs. All the countries concerned 
are potential candidates for EU membership.65
60  Quoted in Arolda Elbasani, ‘The Stabilisation and Association Process in the Balkans: 
Overloaded Agenda and Weak Incentives?’(2008) EUI Working Paper SPS 2008/03 Euro-
pean University Institute, 1 <http://cadmus.eui.eu> accessed 25 May 2012.
61  Trauner (n 58) 3.
62  See COM (1999) 235 ﬁ nal, Brussels, 26 May 1999.
63  Steven Blockmans, ‘Tough Love. The European Union’s Relations with the Western Bal-
kans’ (1st edn, TMC Asser Press 2007) 251.
64  See Commission’s website on Enlargement <http://www.ec.europe.eu/enlargement> 
accessed 25 May 2012. 
65  European Council (2000) Presidency Conclusions, 19 and 20 June 2000 Santa Maria 
da Feira, point 67.
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 The Zagreb Summit of Heads of State and Government of the 
EU Member States and the SAP countries in November 2000 played an 
essential role in securing the agreement of the regional countries to a 
clear set of objectives and conditions.66 The Final Declaration Stated that 
‘democracy and regional reconciliation and cooperation on the one hand, 
and the rapprochement of each of these countries with the European 
Union on the other, form the whole’.67 Furthermore, the heads of regional 
states or governments committed themselves to establishing: 
Regional cooperation conventions providing for a political dialogue, 
a regional free trade area and close cooperation in the ﬁ eld of justice 
and home affairs, in particular for the reinforcement of justice and 
the independence thereof, for combating organized crime, corrup-
tion, money laundering, illegal immigration, trafﬁ cking in human 
beings and all other forms of trafﬁ cking. These conventions will be 
incorporated in the stabilisation and association agreements as they 
are concluded with the European Union.68 
At the EU Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003, 
it was reafﬁ rmed that ‘rapprochement with the EU will go hand in hand 
with the development of regional cooperation’ and that the ‘SAP will re-
main the framework for the European course of the Western Balkan coun-
tries, all the way to their future accession’.69 At the summit, the Council 
endorsed the so-called ‘Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: 
Moving towards European Integration’, which strengthened the SAP and 
supplemented it with elements drawn from the experience of enlargement 
to Central and Eastern Europe.70 Similar to the Accession Partnerships 
for the Central and Eastern European countries, European Partnerships 
were launched for the SAP countries to identify priorities for action in sup-
porting the efforts of each speciﬁ c country to move closer to the EU. Once 
again, it was conﬁ rmed that the need for regional cooperation in the area 
of justice, freedom and security was a key priority, especially after the 
Thessaloniki Agenda had emphasised the growing importance of JHA is-
sues in the relations between the EU and the Western Balkan countries.71 
The concern and the focus of the EU in this area are obvious in the Coun-
cil Conclusions of the Thessaloniki Agenda which stated that: 
66  Milica Delevic, ‘Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans’ (2007) Institute for Se-
curity Studies European Union, Chaillot Paper No 104, July 2007, 41 <http://www.iss.
europe.eu> accessed 24 May 2012.
67  Zagreb Summit 24 November 2000, Final Declaration, para 2.
68  European Council (n 65) para 3.
69  For the text of the Thessaloniki Agenda, see Annex A to Council Conclusions of 16 June 
2003, Press Release No 10369/03 (Presse 166).
70  Blockmans (n 63) 252.
71  Delevic (n 66) 43.
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Organised crime and corruption are real obstacles to democratic 
stability, sound and accountable institutions, the rule of law, and 
economic development in the Western Balkans and a source of grave 
concern to the EU. Combating them must constitute a key priority 
for the governments of the region. Particular focus should be placed 
upon ﬁ ghting all forms of trafﬁ cking, particularly of human beings, 
drugs and arms, as well as smuggling of goods. Although the SAP 
countries have made some progress, continued efforts at all levels 
will be crucial to advance further in ﬁ ghting organised crime. Their 
commitment must be sustained through effective implementation of 
all instruments necessary in this combat, including improved ad-
ministrative and judicial capacity.72
6. Enlargement a powerful incentive: the use of conditionality
The EU’s focus regarding the Western Balkans on regional coopera-
tion and mutual trust in the ﬁ eld of JHA is, as discussed above, linked 
to the stability of the EU itself. Chris Pattern, as a former EU Com-
missioner for External Relations, stated: ‘The choice for us in this case 
is very clear: either we export stability to the Balkans, or the Balkans 
export instability to us’.73 With the incentive of future membership, the 
EU’s pre-accession policy is a very powerful tool to export the values and 
principles upon which the Union is based, including mutual trust and 
mutual recognition in the JHA area. Regional cooperation and coopera-
tion between the EU and the Western Balkans in the ﬁ eld of JHA is an 
important requirement of the SAP and a pre-condition to prepare for 
membership. This was well expressed by the Council of the European 
Union in the EU’s external strategy of December 2005:
The prospect of enlargement is an effective way to align with EU 
standards in justice and home affairs in candidate countries and 
those with a European perspective, both through the adoption and 
implementation of the acquis and through improvements in opera-
tional contracts and cooperation.74
With the incentive of membership in mind, the academic literature 
distinguished ﬁ ve mechanisms with which the EU managed to change 
governance patterns.75 The ﬁ rst mechanism is so-called ‘gate keeping’, 
72  Thessaloniki Agenda (n 69).
73  Chris Patten, Speech at the Western Balkans Democracy Forum, Thessaloniki, 11 April 
2002  <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/ear/publications/main/pub-speech_
thessaloniki_20020411.htm> accessed 9 April 2012.
74  Council of the European Union, A Strategy for the External Action of JHA: Global Free-
dom, Security and Justice, 15446/05, 6 December 2005. 
75  See Heather Grabbe, ‘Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU 
Accession Process’ in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Eu-
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where a country, one step at a time, proceeds towards EU membership. 
This process begins with the SAP, which is in each case a bilateral affair 
between the EU and the applicant country. The focal point of the SAP 
is the conclusion of an SAA which represents a far-reaching contractual 
relationship between the EU and each Western Balkan country. Proper 
implementation of the SAA opens the way for the next step on the road to 
membership, namely, the application for membership. If the EU decides 
to grant the applicant country real candidate status, which is impor-
tant because candidate countries can use EU ﬁ nancial assistance in all 
areas, the next step is the opening of concrete accession negotiations. 
However, before the accession negotiations can take place, the applicant 
country has to reach a sufﬁ cient degree of general compliance with the 
Copenhagen Criteria and full cooperation with the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
The second mechanism is the models which are the provisions of 
legislative and institutional templates corresponding with the EU ac-
quis, and harmonisation with EU regulations. However, as expressed by 
Trauner: 
The legal downloading of the acquis was not deﬁ ned as a top priority 
for the Western Balkans, given the comparatively low level of Eu-
ropean integration and institutional stability. Rather, the SAP was 
constructed in such a way as to link the agenda of European integra-
tion with the stabilisation and transformation of these countries on 
a more fundamental level.76 
For the JHA area, this involved four primary areas: police, public or-
der and organised crime; integrated border management; judicial reform; 
and asylum and migration. In order to achieve European integration in 
these areas, the EU has a regional strategy to improve regional coopera-
tion in the four key priorities and a country speciﬁ c strategy, deﬁ ned in 
the European Partnerships. 
The third mechanism is ﬁ nancial assistance offered within the 
framework of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).77 The 
IPA was established in July 2006, which replaced several instruments 
for ﬁ nancial assistance, including the Community Assistance for Re-
construction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) which was mainly 
ropeanization (OUP 2003) 312; Florian Trauner, ‘Deconstructing the EU’s Routes of Inﬂ u-
ence in Justice and Home Affairs in the Western Balkans’ (2009) 31 Journal of European 
Integration 65.
76  Trauner (n 75) 72.
77  The Legal basis for this assistance is Council Regulation 1085/2006, adopted on 17 July 
2006. More detailed implementing rules are laid down in Commission Regulation 718/2007 
and in Commission Regulation 80/2010 of 28 January 2010.
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dedicated to the region of the Western Balkans.78 In the period between 
2007 and 2013, total pre-accession funding was EUR 11.5 billion and the 
proposed amount by the Commission for the period 2014-2020 is EUR 
14.1 billion.79 Actions funded through IPA are in line with the priorities 
set out in the European Partnerships for each country and in the en-
largement strategy and progress reports published each autumn. In the 
Commission’s proposal for a Regulation on the IPA II of 7 December 2011, 
justice and home affairs is still a key priority of cooperation within the 
Western Balkans. The Commission stated: 
Making Europe a safer place is high on the EU’s agenda as deﬁ ned 
in the Stockholm Programme. The improved strategic orientation of 
ﬁ nancial assistance for pre-accession will help support enlargement 
countries in preventing and tackling organised crime and corruption 
and in strengthening their law enforcement, border management 
and migration control capabilities.80 
The fourth mechanism is benchmarking and monitoring. Since April 
2002, the Commission has used annual Progress Reports to record and 
monitor achievements and weaknesses and to determine the key priori-
ties for the following year for the Western Balkans. These annual reports 
are completed with individual country reports, with a speciﬁ c chapter 
on cooperation in justice and home affairs. The European Commission’s 
opinion on a country’s application for membership is a very important 
facet of monitoring and forms the basis on which the Council decides to 
grant an applicant candidate status. Thus far, there has been a Commis-
sion opinion concerning Croatia,81 the Former Yugoslav Republic of Mac-
edonia,82 Montenegro83 and Serbia.84 When negotiations are approaching, 
the Commission ﬁ rst examines each chapter with the candidate country, 
to see how well the candidate country is prepared. This process is known 
as ‘screening’. Subsequently, the Commission reports to the Council on 
the screening of each chapter, and recommends whether to open negotia-
tions on it or to require that certain conditions, so-called opening bench-
78  Council Regulation EC No 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000.
79  Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II)’ COM (2011) 838 ﬁ nal.
80  Commission (n 79) 4.
81  Commission, ‘Opinion on Croatia’s application for membership of the European Union 
COM (2004) 257 ﬁ nal.
82  Commission, ‘Opinion on the application from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia for membership of the European Union’ (Communication) COM (2005) 562 ﬁ nal.
83  Commission, ‘Opinion on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European 
Union (Communication) COM (2010) 670.
84  Commission, ‘Opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union’ 
(Communication) COM (2011) 668 ﬁ nal.
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marks, be met ﬁ rst.85 However, the Commission can also recommend to 
open the negotiations and to set closing benchmarks, which should be 
met in order to close a particular chapter. Benchmarking is a relatively 
new tool in the enlargement process. The Council agreed upon the use 
of this instrument in December 2004 after a proposal by the Commis-
sion. Its purpose is to ‘improve the quality of negotiations, by providing 
incentives for the candidate country to undertake necessary reforms at 
an early stage’.86
The last mechanism of Europeanisation is twinning and advice. 
Launched in May 1998, twinning is a very important tool and assists re-
spective countries in bringing their administrative and democratic insti-
tutions in line with European standards in order to help them with the 
implementation of the EU acquis. As quoted in the Twinning Brochure, 
‘Building Europe Together’,87 the contribution of Twinning has been rec-
ognised by the European Court Auditors: 
Twinning is … a positive initiative by the European Commission to 
assist candidate countries in acquiring the capacity to adopt, imple-
ment and enforce the acquis communautaire. The Twinning projects 
acted as a catalyst in setting the candidate countries’ reform in mo-
tion, bringing together specialists from MS and candidate countries’ 
administrations and promoting the adoption of the Community leg-
islation (…).88 
The ﬁ rst Western Balkan twinning programme concerning justice 
and home affairs was the project ‘Integrated Border Management: Border 
Police’, implemented in Croatia with Slovenian and German twinning 
partners between 2002 and 2004. 
Apart from the ﬁ ve mechanisms discussed above, the EU’s condition-
ality approach in the Western Balkans has been strengthened through 
the incentive of visa liberalisation which has encouraged reforms in do-
mestic justice and home affairs in the region. Although the Maastricht 
Treaty introduced visa policy into the EU framework, the Treaty of Am-
sterdam developed the EU’s visa policy further.89 As a result of the Am-
85  Commission website (n 64).
86  Commission, ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007. Including an-
nexed special report on the EU’s capacity to integrate new members’ (Communication) COM 
(2006) 649 ﬁ nal.
87  Commission, ‘Twinning Brochure: Building Europe Together’ 2006 <http://ec.europa.
eu/enlargement/pdf/twinning_brochure_2005_en.pdf> accessed 14 April 2012.
88  For the full version of the Court of Auditors report, see <http://www.eca.eu.int/au-
dit_reports/special_reports/docs/2003/rs06_03en.pdf> accessed 14 April 2012.
89  The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced Title IV on ‘Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other 
Policies related to Free Movement of Persons’ and fell under the ﬁ rst pillar, In addition, the 
Schengen acquis was integrated into the EU’s legal framework.
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sterdam Treaty, the EU constructed two lists of third countries, a posi-
tive visa list which named the countries whose citizens do not require a 
visa to enter the EU, and a negative visa list which stated the countries 
whose citizens do need a visa to enter the EU.90 Initially, all Western Bal-
kan countries apart from Croatia were placed on the negative list. This 
made travelling to the EU for the citizens of the Western Balkans very 
expensive. In 2003, the Thessaloniki Agenda ﬁ rst introduced the pros-
pect of a liberalised visa regime, depending on the fulﬁ lment of certain 
conditions: 
The EU is aware of the importance the peoples and governments in 
the Western Balkans attach to the perspective of liberalization of the 
visa regime. Meanwhile, progress is dependent on these countries 
implementing major reforms in areas such as the strengthening of 
the rule of law, combating organised crime, corruption and illegal 
migration, and strengthening their administrative capacity in border 
control and security in documents.91
In January 2008, readmission agreements entered into force with 
Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. 
This allowed these countries to enter negotiations for free-visa travel. 
Each of these countries received a roadmap which deﬁ ned the key areas 
and the precise conditions to be met in order to move towards visa lib-
eralisation. The roadmaps covered four areas of cooperation: document 
security; illegal migration and readmission; public order and security; 
and external relations and fundamental rights. Hence, in addition to 
membership conditionality, the EU also created a policy conditionality 
in justice and home affairs in order to motivate the Western Balkans to 
implement the EU acquis and the values and principles upon which the 
Union is founded.
Nevertheless, both for membership conditionality and policy condi-
tionality, credibility is vital. As mentioned by Sedelmeier, 
credibility has two sides. The candidates have to be certain that they 
will receive the promised rewards after meeting the EU’s demands. 
Yet they also have to believe that they will only receive the reward if 
they indeed fully meet the requirements.92 
90  Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and 
those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement [2001] OJ L81/1.
91  Thessaloniki Agenda (n 69) para 3.
92  Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States’ (2006) 1 
Living Reviews in European Governance 12 <http://europeagovernance.livingreviews.org/
Articles/Ireg-2006-3/> accessed 25 May 2012.
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If a country receives a reward, in terms of advancing in the step-
by-step process, this can be seen as a signal to all the Western Balkan 
countries.93 This is evident in the Commission’s Communication con-
cerning the enlargement strategy of 2011-2012, wherein the Commission 
pointed out that: 
The pace at which each country advances towards membership de-
pends mainly on its performance in meeting the established criteria and 
conditions.
Croatia’s successful experience sends strong messages to other en-
largement countries:
• The EU delivers on its commitments once the conditions are met.
• The criteria and conditions for accession are demanding and their 
implementation is monitored with increased attention. This, how-
ever, is not an obstacle, but results in the candidate state achiev-
ing a higher level of readiness which will beneﬁ t both it and the EU 
upon accession.
• Bilateral disputes with neighbours should and can be addressed 
through dialogue and compromise, in line with established prin-
ciples.94
However, although Croatia signed the Accession Treaty on 9 Decem-
ber 2011 and will become a Member of the European Union on 1 July 
2013,95 the Commission is still closely monitoring all commitments under-
taken by Croatia in the accession negotiations. According to article 36 of 
the Act of Accession, the monitoring mechanism for Croatia consist of 
regularly updated monitoring tables, dialogue under the Stabilisa-
tion and Association Agreement between the European Communi-
ties and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Croatia, of the other part, peer assessment missions, the pre- acces-
sion economic programme, ﬁ scal notiﬁ cations and, when necessary, 
early warning letters to the Croatian authorities. 
The ﬁ ght against corruption and the commitments undertaken by 
Croatia in the area of freedom, security and justice are issues on which 
93  Trauner (n 75) 72.
94  Commission, ‘Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2011-2012 (Communication) 
COM (2011) 666 ﬁ nal 4.
95  Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Croatia and the adjust-
ments to the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community [2012] OJ 
L112/21.
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the Commission has to focus while monitoring Croatia.96 The moni-
toring report of the Commission of April 2012 on Croatia´s accession 
preparations shows the progress that Croatia is still making with re-
gard to both issues.97 The report also stipulates speciﬁ c points that 
need to be addressed and improved, including a migration strategy en-
suring a broader approach to protection of migrants and refuges, and 
vigilance is required with regard to corruption at the local level, in 
particular procurement cases.98 This demonstrates that even though 
the accession negotiations with Croatia are closed, the country is still 
being scrutinised by the Commission, where the JHA area is receiving 
particular attention. 
7. Conclusion
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the principles 
of mutual recognition and mutual trust have become crucial elements 
to realise the objective of the Union as an ‘area of freedom, security 
and justice’. This later obtained an even more prominent position in the 
Treaty of Lisbon. Together with the growing importance of the develop-
ment of the Union as an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’, regional 
cooperation in the Western Balkans in the JHA area has become a key 
priority in pre-accession policy. With the incentive of future membership, 
the pre-accession framework is a very powerful mechanism to export 
the values and principles of the EU, including mutual trust and mutual 
recognition in the ﬁ eld of JHA. While all Member States are supposed 
to adhere to these values and principles, the NS judgment, the Assange 
saga, and the ECHR case law related to article 6 demonstrate that the 
EU is aware that some of its Member States do not comply with the 
values and principles that are so forcefully imposed on candidate and 
potential candidate countries. Furthermore, the enforcement machinery 
available to force the current Member States to comply with the principle 
of mutual trust and mutual recognition is relatively weak, while the pre-
accession conditionality mechanisms are very strong. This illustrates 
that there are double standards in the EU regarding the expectations 
and requirements in the pre-accession policy for the Western Balkans 
and the compliance and enforcement of the common values and princi-
ples with regard to current Member States in the JHA area. 
96  See Act concerning the conditions of accession (n 95) Article 36.
97  Commission, ‘Monitoring report on Croatia’s accession preparations’ (Communication) 
COM (2012) 186 ﬁ nal. 
98  See for more examples and detail, Commission (n 97) para 2.2.5 and 2.3.
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Nonetheless, it is understandable that the EU is very strict towards 
the Western Balkans regarding fulﬁ lment of requirements in the JHA 
area, since noncompliance undermines the entire system based on mu-
tual trust, which is a prerequisite for the development of the Union as an 
area of freedom, security and justice. The Cooperation and Veriﬁ cation 
Mechanism used for Romania and Bulgaria shows how weak post-condi-
tionality is when Member States do not really share the values of the EU. 
Hence, compliance with the common values and principles upon which 
the Union is founded should be one of the cornerstones of pre-accession 
policy. 
